The Fed should offer full transparency. These are the reasons the Fed gives for secrecy:

“The Fed argued that allowing disclosure could stigmatize banks, causing a loss of confidence that could lead to deposit runs, bank failures and damage to the economy.”

The fact that the Fed fears a liquidity crisis is evidence that it doesn’t understand banking.

With the FDIC offering deposit insurance for up to 100% of any bank’s liabilities, it should be clear to the Fed the liability side of banking is not the place for market discipline. Liquidity should not be an issue and it should be provided in unlimited quantities at all times, much like most of the rest of the world’s central banks have been doing for a long time.

All the Fed has to do is simply trade in the fed funds market and offer any bank unlimited funding at the Fed’s target interest rate, and turn all of their focus on regulating the asset side of banking where it belongs.

The Fed should be audited NOW, and get this issue behind them as soon as possible.

Aug 25 (Reuters) — The Federal Reserve asked a U.S. appeals court to delay implementing a ruling that would force the central bank to disclose details of its emergency lending programs to banks during the financial crisis.

Wednesday’s emergency request for a 90-day delay came after the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals on August 20 denied a motion by the Fed to rehear the case, which had been brought by Bloomberg LP, the parent of Bloomberg News, and News Corp’s Fox News Network.

A stay would give the Fed and the Clearing House Association, a group of major U.S. and European banks, until November 18 to appeal the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Fed programs were designed to shore up the financial markets, and more than doubled the central bank’s balance sheet to well over $2 trillion, especially after the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

In March, the Second Circuit ordered the Fed to disclose information, including the names of bailout recipients and amounts received, that the news media had requested under the federal Freedom of Information Act.

The Fed argued that allowing disclosure could stigmatize banks, causing a loss of confidence that could lead to deposit runs, bank failures and damage to the economy.

In its Wednesday filing, the Fed said denial of a stay would “force the government to let the cat out of the bag, without any effective way of recapturing it” if the Second Circuit ruling were later reversed.

“The public policy interest identified by the government will be irreversibly lost,” it added.

Fed spokesman David Skidmore said “the stay is necessary to permit the board to consult with the Department of Justice regarding an appeal to the Supreme Court.”

Comments and ramblings:

“Strong multiplier effects from construction jobs to broader economy.”

Good report!!!

I used to call this the ‘get a job, buy a car, get a job buy a house’ accelerator. And yes, it has happened in past business cycles and been a strong driver. But going back to the last Bush up leg, turns out it was supported to a reasonably large degree by the ‘subprime fraud’ dynamic of ‘make 30k/year, buy a 300k house’ with fraudulent appraisals and fraudulent income statements. And the Clinton up leg was supported by the funding of impossible .com business plans and y2k fear driven investment, and the Reagan years by the S&L up leg that resulted in 1T in bad loans, back when that was a lot of money. Japan, on the other hand, has carefully avoided, lets say, a credit boom based on something they would have regretted in hindsight, as was the case in the US.

The point is it takes a lot of deficit spending to overcome the demand leakages, and with the govt down to less than 6% of GDP this year, yes, ‘legit’ housing can add quite a bit, but can it add more than it did in Japan, for example? And, to the point of this report, will it be enough to move the Fed?

Also, looks to me like, at the macro level, credit is driven by/limited by income (real or imagined), and the proactive deficit reduction measures like the FICA hikes and the sequesters have directly removed income, as had QE and the rate cuts in general. So yes, debt is down as a % of income, but the level of income is being suppressed (call it income repression policy?) through pro active fiscal and the low number of people working and getting paid for it.

Domestic energy production adds another interesting dimension. It means dollar income is being earned by firms operating domestically that would have been earned by overseas agents. The question here is whether that adds to incomes that gets spent domestically. That is, did the dollars go to foreigners who spent it all on fighter jets, or did they just let them sit in financial assets vs the domestic oil company? Does it spend more of its dollar earnings domestically than the foreign agent did, or just build cash, etc? And either way its dollar friendly, which also means more non oil imports, particularly with portfolio managers ‘subsidizing’ exports from Japan with their currency shifting. That should be a ‘good thing’ for us, as it means taxes can be that much lower for a given size govt, but of course the politicians don’t have enough sense to do that. It all comes back to the question of whether the deficit is too small.

As for banking and lending, anecdotally , my direct experience with regulators is that they are ‘bad’ and vindictive people, much like many IRS agents I’ve come across, and right now they are engaging in what the Fed calls ‘regulatory over reach’, particularly at the small bank level, but also at the large bank level. This makes a bank supported credit boom highly problematic. And without bank support, the non bank sector is limited as well.

Lastly, there’s a difference between deficits coming down via automatic stabilizers and via proactive deficit reduction. The automatic stabilizers bring the deficit down when non govt credit growth is ‘already’ strong enough to bring it down, while proactive deficit reduction, aka ‘austerity’ does it ‘ahead of’ non govt credit growth, which means austerity can/does keep non govt credit growth from materializing (via income/savings reduction).

Conclusion- the Fed is correct in being concerned about our domestic dynamics. And they are right about being concerned about the rest of the global economy. Europe is still going backwards, as is China where they are cutting back on the growth of debt by local govts and state banks, all of which ‘counts’ as part of the deficit spending that drove prior levels of growth. And softer resource prices hit the resource exporters who growth is leveraged to the higher prices. I wrote a while back about what happens when the longer term commodity cycle peaks, supply tends to catch up and prices tend to fall back to marginal costs of production, etc.

And the Fed has to suspect, at least, the QE isn’t going to do anything for output and employment in Japan, any more than it’s actually done for the US.

Karim writes:

Very substantive speech from Bernanke.

Message is basically, ‘growth has slowed more than we expected’ BUT ‘conditions are ALREADY in place for a pick-up’ and if we are wrong, we are ready to take action, which contrary to some perceptions, will be effective.

Yes, contrary to my opinion. This about managing expectations. With falling inflation and unemployment this high it makes no sense that they would be holding back something that could make a material difference.

To me, they lay out very credible factors for a pick-up in growth.

Agreed.

The risk of either an undesirable rise in inflation or of significant further disinflation seems low-THIS LINE ARGUES AGAINST ANY NEAR-TERM ACTION.

Again, if they did have anything that would substantially increase agg demand they’d have done it.

When listing available options for further action if needed, he clearly favors further ‘credit easing’ relative to the other choices. He states why they reinvested in USTs vs MBS.

Yes, and, again, it’s doubtful lower credit spreads will do much for the macro economy but would shift a lot of credit risks to the Fed for very little gain.

At best, though, fiscal impetus and the inventory cycle can drive recovery only temporarily.

That is not correct. Fiscal adjustment can sustain demand at any politically desired level.

For a sustained expansion to take hold, growth in private final demand–notably, consumer spending and business fixed investment–must ultimately take the lead. On the whole, in the United States, that critical handoff appears to be under way.

Agreed that hand off is slowly materializing and private sector debt expansion will then drive additional growth. But sustained expansion could come immediately from a fiscal adjustment as well.

However, although private final demand, output, and employment have indeed been growing for more than a year, the pace of that growth recently appears somewhat less vigorous than we expected.

Agreed.

Among the most notable results to emerge from the recent revision of the U.S. national income data is that, in recent quarters, household saving has been higher than we thought–averaging near 6 percent of disposable income rather than 4 percent, as the earlier data showed.

Non govt net savings of financial assets = govt deficit spending by identity, and with foreign sector savings relatively constant, the majority of the increase is in the domestic economy, either businesses or households.

That means in general household savings goes up with the deficit regardless of the level of consumer spending.

However, when household savings does start to fall, it’s due to household credit expansion, at which time, if the deficit is unchanged, the savings of financial assets is shifted to either the business or the foreign sector.

And, as growth accelerates, the automatic fiscal stabilizers- increased federal revenues and falling transfer payments- reduce the deficit and therefore reduce the growth in the total net savings of the other sectors..

So the hand off process is usually characterized by the federal deficit falling as private sector debt expands to ‘replace it.

That means in general household savings goes up with the deficit regardless of the level of consumer spending.

This continues until the private sector again necessarily gets over leveraged, ending the expansion.

On the one hand, this finding suggests that households, collectively, are even more cautious about the economic outlook and their own prospects than we previously believed.

At best his means that he thinks with this much savings households would start leveraging more.

But on the other hand, the upward revision to the saving rate also implies greater progress in the repair of household balance sheets. Stronger balance sheets should in turn allow households to increase their spending more rapidly as credit conditions ease and the overall economy improves.

Yes, as I explained. He seems to understand the sequence of the data but doesn’t seem to be quite there on the causation.

Going forward, improved affordability–the result of lower house prices and record-low mortgage rates–should boost the demand for housing. However, the overhang of foreclosed-upon and vacant housing and the difficulties of many households in obtaining mortgage financing are likely to continue to weigh on the pace of residential investment for some time yet.

Yes, which is a traditional source of private sector credit expansion, along with cars, that drives the process.

Generally speaking, large firms in good financial condition can obtain credit easily and on favorable terms; moreover, many large firms are holding exceptionally large amounts of cash on their balance sheets. For these firms, willingness to expand–and, in particular, to add permanent employees–depends primarily on expected increases in demand for their products, not on financing costs.

I couldn’t agree more!

Employment is primarily a function of sales as discussed in prior posts.

Bank-dependent smaller firms, by contrast, have faced significantly greater problems obtaining credit, according to surveys and anecdotes. The Federal Reserve, together with other regulators, has been engaged in significant efforts to improve the credit environment for small businesses. For example, through the provision of specific guidance and extensive examiner training, we are working to help banks strike a good balance between appropriate prudence and reasonable willingness to make loans to creditworthy borrowers. We have also engaged in extensive outreach efforts to banks and small businesses. There is some hopeful news on this front: For the most part, bank lending terms and conditions appear to be stabilizing and are even beginning to ease in some cases, and banks reportedly have become more proactive in seeking out creditworthy borrowers.

Another problem is that the regulators are forcing small banks to reduce what’s called ‘non core funding’ in a confused strategy to enhance small bank ‘deposit stability.’ Unfortunately, at the local level the regulators have interpreted the rules to mean, for example, it’s better for a small bank’s financial stability to fund, for example, a 3 year business loan with 1 year local deposits, vs funding it with a 5 year advance from the Federal Home loan bank. It’s also a fallacy of composition, as at the macro level there aren’t enough core deposits to fund local small businesses, as many larger corporations and individuals use money center banks and leave their deposits with them. The regulatory insistence on small banks using ‘core deposits’ rather than ‘wholesale funding’ recycled from the larger banks causes a shortage of local deposits and forces the small banks to pay substantially higher rates as they compete with each other for funding artificially limited by regulation.

In lieu of adding permanent workers, some firms have increased labor input by increasing workweeks, offering full-time work to part-time workers, and making extensive use of temporary workers.

Yes, and when you include this growth in employment the economy is doing better than most analysts seem to think.

Like others, we were surprised by the sharp deterioration in the U.S. trade balance in the second quarter. However, that deterioration seems to have reflected a number of temporary and special factors. Generally, the arithmetic contribution of net exports to growth in the gross domestic product tends to be much closer to zero, and that is likely to be the case in coming quarters.

Also, part of the hand off will be US consumers going into debt (reducing savings) to buy foreign goods and services, which increases foreign sector savings of financial assets.

Overall, the incoming data suggest that the recovery of output and employment in the United States has slowed in recent months, to a pace somewhat weaker than most FOMC participants projected earlier this year. Much of the unexpected slowing is attributable to the household sector, where consumer spending and the demand for housing have both grown less quickly than was anticipated. Consumer spending may continue to grow relatively slowly in the near term as households focus on repairing their balance sheets. I expect the economy to continue to expand in the second half of this year, albeit at a relatively modest pace.

Agreed.

Despite the weaker data seen recently, the preconditions for a pickup in growth in 2011 appear to remain in place.

Agreed.

Monetary policy remains very accommodative

Yes, for many borrowers, but the lower rates have also net reduced incomes. QE alone resulted in some $50 billion of ‘profits’ transfered to the Treasury from the Fed that would have been private sector income, for example.

and financial conditions have become more supportive of growth, in part because a concerted effort by policymakers in Europe has reduced fears related to sovereign debts and the banking system there.

Agreed.

Banks are improving their balance sheets and appear more willing to lend.

Agreed, though via a reduction in interest earned by savers that’s gone to increased net interest margins for banks.

Consumers are reducing their debt and building savings, returning household wealth-to-income ratios near to longer-term historical norms.

Yes, ‘funded’ by the federal deficit spending.

Stronger household finances, rising incomes, and some easing of credit conditions will provide the basis for more-rapid growth in household spending next year.

Yes, and that basis is credit expansion.

If the bank depositor wants cash, his bank gets the cash from the CB, and the CB debits the bank’s reserve account. So the person who got paid holds the cash and his bank has no deposit at the CB and the person has no bank deposit.

On the fiscal front, state and local governments continue to be under pressure; but with tax receipts showing signs of recovery, their spending should decline less rapidly than it has in the past few years. Federal fiscal stimulus seems set to continue to fade but likely not so quickly as to derail growth in coming quarters.

Yes, and traditionally matched or exceeded by private sector credit expansion as above.

Recently, inflation has declined to a level that is slightly below that which FOMC participants view as most conducive to a healthy economy in the long run. With inflation expectations reasonably stable and the economy growing, inflation should remain near current readings for some time before rising slowly toward levels more consistent with the Committee’s objectives. At this juncture, the risk of either an undesirable rise in inflation or of significant further disinflation seems low. Of course, the Federal Reserve will monitor price developments closely.

The channels through which the Fed’s purchases affect longer-term interest rates and financial conditions more generally have been subject to debate.

With the debate subsiding as more FOMC participants, but far from all of them, seem to be coming to understand the quantity of the reserves per se has no consequences.

I see the evidence as most favorable to the view that such purchases work primarily through the so-called portfolio balance channel, which holds that once short-term interest rates have reached zero, the Federal Reserve’s purchases of longer-term securities affect financial conditions by changing the quantity and mix of financial assets held by the public. Specifically, the Fed’s strategy relies on the presumption that different financial assets are not perfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios, so that changes in the net supply of an asset available to investors affect its yield and those of broadly similar assets. Thus, our purchases of Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS likely both reduced the yields on those securities and also pushed investors into holding other assets with similar characteristics, such as credit risk and duration. For example, some investors who sold MBS to the Fed may have replaced them in their portfolios with longer-term, high-quality corporate bonds, depressing the yields on those assets as well.

This is evidence Bernanke himself has come around to the understanding that the quantity of reserves at the Fed per se is of no further economic consequence.

We decided to reinvest in Treasury securities rather than agency securities because the Federal Reserve already owns a very large share of available agency securities, suggesting that reinvestment in Treasury securities might be more effective in reducing longer-term interest rates and improving financial conditions with less chance of adverse effects on market functioning.

Again, it shows the understanding that QE channel is price (interest rates) and not quantities.

This is a very constructive move from understanding indicated in prior statements.

Also, as I already noted, reinvestment in Treasury securities is more consistent with the Committee’s longer-term objective of a portfolio made up principally of Treasury securities. We do not rule out changing the reinvestment strategy if circumstances warrant, however.

In particular, the Committee is prepared to provide additional monetary accommodation through unconventional measures if it proves necessary, especially if the outlook were to deteriorate significantly. The issue at this stage is not whether we have the tools to help support economic activity and guard against disinflation. We do. As I will discuss next, the issue is instead whether, at any given juncture, the benefits of each tool, in terms of additional stimulus, outweigh the associated costs or risks of using the tool.

Notwithstanding the fact that the policy rate is near its zero lower bound, the Federal Reserve retains a number of tools and strategies for providing additional stimulus. I will focus here on three that have been part of recent staff analyses and discussion at FOMC meetings: (1) conducting additional purchases of longer-term securities, (2) modifying the Committee’s communication, and (3) reducing the interest paid on excess reserves. I will also comment on a fourth strategy, proposed by several economists–namely, that the FOMC increase its inflation goals.

In my humble opinion those tools carry no risk and provide no reward to the macro economy.

Don’t only drop the interest rate paid on banks’ excess reserves, charge them.

That would be a tax that reduces aggregate demand.

December 10 (WSJ) — Unless you are part of the tiny portion of humanity that dotes on every utterance of the Federal Open Market Committee, you probably missed an important statement regarding the arcane world of “excess reserves” buried deep in the minutes of its Oct. 29-30 policy meeting. It reads: “[M]ost participants thought that a reduction by the Board of Governors in the interest rate paid on excess reserves could be worth considering at some stage.”

They don’t realize paying interest on Fed liabilities is a subsidy to the economy any more than Professor Blinder does.

As perhaps the longest-running promoter of reducing the interest paid on excess reserves, even turning the rate negative, I can assure you that those buried words were momentous. The Fed is famously given to understatement. So when it says that “most” members of its policy committee think a change “could be worth considering,” that’s almost like saying they love the idea. That’s news because they haven’t loved it before.

So what exactly are excess reserves, and why should you care? Like most central banks, the Fed requires banks to hold reserves mainly deposits in their “checking accounts” at the Fed against transactions deposits. Any reserves held over and above these requirements are called excess reserves.

Not long ago say, until Lehman Brothers failed in September 2008banks held virtually no excess reserves because idle cash earned them nothing.

No, because Fed policy was to keep banks net borrowed, and then implement its policy rate via the Fed’s interest rate charges for the subsequent ‘reserve adds’ which were functionally loans from the Fed.

But today they hold a whopping $2.5 trillion in excess reserves, on which the Fed pays them an interest rate of 25 basis pointsfor an annual total of about $6.25 billion. That 25 basis points, what the Fed calls the IOER (interest on excess reserves), is the issue.

Yes, thereby supporting their policy rate decision, which happens to be a ‘range’ a bit above 0, which also happens to be a display of the Fed’s failure to understand monetary operations.

Unlike the Fed’s main policy tool, the federal-funds rate, the IOER is not market-determined. It’s completely controlled by the Fed. So instead of paying banks to hold all those excess reserves, it could charge banks a small fee, i.e., a negative interest rate, for the privilege.

At this point, you’re probably thinking: “Wait. If the Fed charged banks rather than paid them, wouldn’t bankers shun excess reserves?” Yes, and that’s precisely the point. Excess reserves sitting idle in banks’ accounts at the Fed do nothing to boost the economy. We want banks to use the money.

Reserves are assets. They can’t be ‘used’ to boost the economy. Banks can sell their reserves to other banks, but in any case the total persists as Fed liabilities. Nothing the banks can do will change that.

If the Fed turned the IOER negative, banks would hold fewer excess reserves, maybe a lot fewer. They’d find other uses for the money. One such use would be buying short-term securities. Another would probably be lending more, which is what we want.

When banks buy securities or lend, their reserve account is debited and the bank of the seller of the securities or of the borrower gets its reserve account credited. That is, the assets called reserves are merely shifted from one bank to another, with the quantity of reserves held by the banking system remaining unchanged.

A second reason for cutting the IOER answers some of the criticisms the Fed has taken for its asset-buying programs called quantitative-easing: Doing so would stimulate the economy without increasing the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. In fact, the Fed could probably shrink its balance sheet.

Why would charging banks a fee stimulate the economy?

And further note that, before the current budget agreement, these ‘fees’ were called taxes, and for a good reason! ;)

To understand why, think back to the good old days, when excess reserves were zero. When the Fed injected reserves into the banking system, banks would use those funds to increase lending, thereby creating multiple expansions of the money supply and credit. Bank reserves were called “high-powered money” because each new dollar of reserves led to several additional dollars of money and credit.

I’ll give Professor Blinder the benefit of the doubt and assume the ‘good old days’ were the days of the gold standard, a fixed fx regime, where banking was continuously reserve constrained, interest rates were market determined, and bank lending was thereby constrained by the necessity to keep ‘real dollars’ on hand to meet depositors potential demands for withdrawals.

With today’s floating fx policy none of this is applicable.

The financial crisis short-circuited this process. As greed gave way to fear, bankers decided to store trillions of dollars safely at the Fed rather than lend them out. High-powered money became powerless money.

Here it seems he conflates the issue of liquidity and interbank lending with the issue of lending to the real economy, along with more inapplicable gold standard analysis.

Banking is always a case of loans creating deposits. And with today’s institutional structure, when deposits carry reserve requirements, in the first instance those requirements are functionally overdrafts in that bank’s reserve account at the Fed. And an overdraft is a loan, and booked as a loan from the Fed on statement day if it persists. So in fact loans create both deposits and any required reserves at the instant the loan is funded.

So rather than ‘high powered money’ as is the case with a gold standard, reserves today are best thought of as residual.

The Fed compounded the problem in October 2008 by starting to pay interest on reserves. And these days, the 25-basis-point IOER looks pretty good compared with most short-term money rates.

As it always is due to ‘market forces’. The entire term structure of rates continuously adjusts to the Fed’s policy rate which generally imposed by targeting the Fed funds rate.

If banks were charged rather than paid 25 basis points, they would find holding excess reserves a lot less attractive. As some of this excess central-bank money became “high-powered” again, the Fed would want less of it. So its balance sheet could shrink.

I don’t follow this part at all. Banks always find holding reserves ‘unattractive’ as the Fed funds rate is likewise their marginal cost of funds. So reserves are, in general, never a profitable investment, and banks are always looking for investments that yield more, on a risk adjusted basis, than their cost of funds.

What are the arguments against turning the IOER negative? Over the years, Fed officials have made three, none of them cogent.

One is that cutting the IOER would have only modest stimulative effects. Well, probably. But are there more powerful tools sitting around unused? Besides, there is at least a chance that we’d get more new lending than the Fed thinks.

There’s a much larger chance that this new tax, though modest, will nonetheless reduce aggregate demand. With the economy a large net saver, and the govt a large net payer of interest, in general higher rates increase income and lower rates decrease income.

Second, there is a limit to how far negative the IOER can go. After all, banks can earn zero by keeping paper money in their vaults. So if the Fed charged a very high fee for holding excess reserves, bankers might find it worthwhile to pay the costs of bigger vaults and more security guards in order to keep huge stockpiles of cash. Sure. But a mere 25 basis point fee is not enough incentive for them to do so.

If it was realized negative rates are a tax, the argument would never get this far.

Third, a negative IOER could drive short-term interest rates even closer to zero, as banks moved balances from their reserve accounts into money market instruments. And that, we are told, would wreak havoc in the money markets. Really? Perhaps that was a legitimate concern three years ago, but we have now lived with money-market rates hugging zero for years, and capitalism has survived.

And if we eliminated the FDIC deposit insurance cap there would be no need for money market funds in the first place.

Besides, the Fed paid no interest on reserves for the first 94 years of its existence, the European Central Bank has been paying its banks nothing since July 2012, and the Danes have been charging a fee since then. In no case did anything terrible happen.

Instead the banking system was kept net short reserves, and the Fed- the monopoly supplier of net reserves- used the rate charged to cover that ‘overdraft’ to set its policy rate.

That said, suppose the policy failed. Suppose the Fed cut the IOER from 25 basis points to minus 25 basis points, and banks didn’t react at all; they just held on to all their excess reserves. In that unlikely event, cutting the IOER would neither provide stimulus nor enable the Fed to shrink its balance sheet. However, the Fed would start collecting about $6.25 billion per year in fees from banks instead of paying them $6.25 billion in interesta swing of roughly $12.5 billion in the taxpayers’ favor. Some downside.

Like any other tax….

Mr. Blinder, a professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, is the author of “After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead” (Penguin, 2013).

The last time I was here at the European Central Bank (ECB), almost exactly two years ago, I sat on a distinguished panel much like this one to help mark the 10th anniversary of the euro. Even as we celebrated the remarkable achievements of the founders of the common currency, however, the global economy stood near the precipice. Financial markets were volatile and illiquid, and the viability of some of the world’s leading financial institutions had been called into question. With asset prices falling and the flow of credit to the nonfinancial sector constricted, most of the world’s economies had entered what would prove to be a sharp and protracted economic downturn.

By the time of that meeting, the world’s central banks had already taken significant steps to stabilize financial markets and to mitigate the worst effects of the recession, and they would go on to do much more. Very broadly, the responses of central banks to the crisis fell into two classes. First, central banks undertook a range of initiatives to restore normal functioning to financial markets and to strengthen the banking system. They expanded existing lending facilities and created new facilities to provide liquidity to the financial sector. Key examples include the ECB’s one-year long-term refinancing operations, the Federal Reserve’s auctions of discount window credit (via the Term Auction Facility), and the Bank of Japan’s more recent extension of its liquidity supply operations.

He still doesn’t understand that the obvious move is to lend unsecured to member banks in unlimited quantities. The liability side of banking is not the place for market discipline; it’s the asset/capital side.

To help satisfy banks’ funding needs in multiple currencies, central banks established liquidity swap lines that allowed them to draw each other’s currencies and lend those funds to financial institutions in their jurisdictions; the Federal Reserve ultimately established swap lines with 14 other central banks. To help satisfy banks’ funding needs in multiple currencies, central banks established liquidity swap lines that allowed them to draw each other’s currencies and lend those funds to financial institutions in their jurisdictions; the Federal Reserve ultimately established swap lines with 14 other central banks.

He still doesn’t realize what the fed did was to lend approx $600 billion unsecured to foreign governments, for the sole purpose of bringing down LIBOR settings, and that there are far more sensible ways to bring down LIBOR settings. Nor has he realized the public purpose behind prohibiting us banks from using LIBOR in the first place.

Central banks also worked to stabilize financial markets that were important conduits of credit to the nonfinancial sector. For example, the Federal Reserve launched facilities to help stabilize the commercial paper market and the market for asset-backed securities, through which flow much of the funding for student, auto, credit card, and small business loans as well as for commercial mortgages.

Nor has the fed understood how to utilize its member banks, which are public private partnerships, to further public purpose. Rather than buy the collateral in question for its own portfolio, the Fed could have empowered its member banks to do it by such means as, for example, allowing them to put that specific collateral in segregated accounts where the fed would cover losses. This is functionally identical to the fed buying for its own account, but without the costly need for the fed itself to establish trading desks, back office operations, and other associated support structure.

In addition, the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, and other central banks played important roles in stabilizing and strengthening their respective banking systems. In particular, central banks helped develop and oversee stress tests that assessed banks’ vulnerabilities and capital needs. These tests proved instrumental in reducing investors’ uncertainty about banks’ assets and prospective losses, bolstering confidence in the banking system, and facilitating banks’ raising of private capital.

They did this entirely because they were concerned about the banks’ ability to fund themselves, which again misses the point of the liability side of banking not being the place for market discipline. Again, the right move was to lend fed funds to the banks in unlimited quantities on an unsecured basis.

Central banks are also playing an important ongoing role in the development of new international capital and liquidity standards for the banking system that will help protect against future crises.

Again, misses the purpose of capital requirements, which is the pricing of risk. Risk itself is controlled by regulation and supervision.

Second, beyond necessary measures to stabilize financial markets and banking systems, central banks moved proactively to ease monetary policy to help support their economies. Initially, monetary policy was eased through the conventional means of cuts in short-term policy rates, including a coordinated rate cut in October 2008 by the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and other leading central banks. However, as policy rates approached the zero lower bound, central banks eased policy by additional means. For example, some central banks, including the Federal Reserve, sought to reduce longer-term interest rates by communicating that policy rates were likely to remain low for some time. A prominent example of the use of central bank communication to further ease policy was the Bank of Canada’s conditional commitment to keep rates near zero until the end of the second quarter of 2010.1 To provide additional monetary accommodation, several central banks–among them the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan–purchased significant quantities of financial assets, including government debt, mortgage-backed securities, or covered bonds, depending on the central bank. Asset purchases seem to have been effective in easing financial conditions; for example, the evidence suggests that such purchases significantly lowered longer-term interest rates in both the United States and the United Kingdom.2.

Yes, with little or no econometric evidence that lower rates added to aggregate demand. Nor is there any discussion of this controversy.

In fact, it looks to me like lower rates more likely reduced aggregate demand through the interest income channels, and continues to do so.

Although the efforts of central banks to stabilize the financial system and provide monetary accommodation helped set the stage for recovery, economic growth rates in the advanced economies have been relatively weak. Of course, the economic outlook varies importantly by country and region, and the policy responses to these developments among central banks have differed accordingly. In the United States, we have seen a slowing of the pace of expansion since earlier this year. The unemployment rate has remained close to 10 percent since mid-2009, with a substantial fraction of the unemployed out of work for six months or longer. Moreover, inflation has been declining and is currently quite low, with measures of underlying inflation running close to 1 percent. Although we project that economic growth will pick up and unemployment decline somewhat in the coming year, progress thus far has been disappointingly slow.

Yes, the Fed continues to fail to deliver on both of its dual mandates.

In this environment, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) judged that additional monetary policy accommodation was needed to support the economic recovery and help ensure that inflation, over time, is at desired levels.

That is, they were concerned about falling into deflation.

Accordingly, the FOMC announced earlier this month its intention to purchase an additional $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month. The Committee also will maintain its current policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings in longer-term Treasury securities. Financial conditions eased notably in anticipation of the Committee’s announcement, suggesting that this policy will be effective in promoting recovery. As has been the case with more conventional monetary policy in the past, this policy action will be regularly reviewed in light of the evolving economic outlook and the Committee’s assessment of the effects of its policies on the economy.

Note that comments from FOMC members have repeatedly shown they lack a fundamental understanding of actual monetary operations, and are promoting policy accordingly.

I draw several lessons from our collective experience in dealing with the crisis. (My list is by no means exhaustive.) The first lesson is that, in a world in which the consequences of financial crises can be devastating, fostering financial stability is a critical part of overall macroeconomic management. Accordingly, central banks and other financial regulators must be vigilant in monitoring financial markets and institutions for threats to systemic stability and diligent in taking steps to address such threats. Supervision of individual financial institutions, macroprudential monitoring, and monetary policy are mutually reinforcing undertakings, with active involvement in one sphere providing crucial information and expertise for the others. Indeed, at the Federal Reserve, we have restructured our financial supervisory functions so that staff members with expertise in a range of areas–including economics, financial markets, and supervision–work closely together in evaluating potential risks.

Systemic liquidity risk comes from the fed not realizing it should always be offering fed funds at its target rate in unlimited quantities.

That limits risks to bank shareholders (and unsecured debt which is functionally part of the capital structure), and to the FDIC/taxpayers where it has failed to adequately regulate and supervise and losses exceed private equity.

Second, the past two years have demonstrated the value of policy flexibility and openness to new approaches. During the crisis, central banks were creative and innovative, developing programs that played a significant role in easing financial stress and supporting economic activity. As the global financial system and national economies become increasingly complex and interdependent, novel policy challenges will continue to require innovative policy responses.

Unfortunately, it also demonstrated the consequences of not understanding monetary operations and bank fundamentals. For example, there was and continues to be a complete failure to recognize that the treasury buying bank capital under tarp was functionally nothing more than regulatory forbearance, and not an ‘expenditure of tax payer money’.

Third, as was the focus of my remarks two years ago, in addressing financial crises, international cooperation can be very helpful; indeed, given the global integration of financial markets, such cooperation is essential.

It is not. This is another example of failure to understand banking fundamentals and monetary operations. The US is best served by independent banking law, regulation, and supervision.

Central bankers worked closely together throughout the crisis and continue to do so. Our frequent contact, whether in bilateral discussions or in international meetings, permits us to share our thinking, compare analyses, and stay informed of developments around the world. It also enables us to move quickly when shared problems call for swift joint responses, such as the coordinated rate cuts and the creation of liquidity swap lines during the crisis. These actions and others we’ve taken over the past few years underscore our resolve to work together to address our common economic challenges..

Sadly, it’s the blind leading the blind, and we all continue to pay the price.

Looking forward, prospects are favorable for further improvement in the U.S. labor market and the economy more broadly. Low oil prices.

Still seems to leave out the fact that a dollar saved by the buyer of oil is a dollar lost by the seller.

And ongoing employment gains should continue to bolster consumer spending, financial conditions generally remain supportive of growth,.

Yes, but the growth rate of lending has only been relatively modest and stable.

And the highly accommodative monetary policies abroad should work to strengthen global growth.

Low and negative rates and quantitative easing now have a very long history of not resulting in increased aggregate demand.

In addition, some of the headwinds restraining economic growth, including the effects of dollar appreciation on net exports and the effect of lower oil prices on capital spending, should diminish over time.

Yes, but the question is what will replace the lost capital spending? Without that incremental capital expenditure, growth, at best, stagnates and likely goes negative as the ‘demand leakages’ continue to grow.

Also, the weakness in U.S. exports is partially the consequence of lower oil prices as reduced U.S. expense for imported oil = reduced income available to non residents to import U.S. goods and services. And the decline in global oil capital expenditures works against global growth and U.S. exports as well.

As a result, the FOMC expects U.S. GDP growth to strengthen over the remainder of this year and the unemployment rate to decline gradually. As always, however, there are some uncertainties in the economic outlook. Foreign developments, in particular, pose some risks to U.S. growth. Most notably, although the recovery in the Euro area appears to have gained a firmer footing.

That’s due to the weak Euro helping their exports. You can’t have it both ways- if the dollar becomes less of a headwind for the U.S., the Euro will become less of a tailwind for the EU.

Comments:

Mosler: Jul 15, 2015

Comments:

Mosler: Jul 15, 2015